Realization *.
| Autor | Hendel, Giovanna |
RESUMEN: Hasta el momento no se ha expuesto detalladamente ninguna explicación clara de la noción de realización, a pesar de que se usa con frecuencia en los textos filosóficos para desempeñar funciones importantes, como explicar la eficacia causal de lo mental en un mundo físico, y proporcionar una caracterización viable del fisicalismo, y/o de la reducción psicofísica. Presento una explicación de la realización como una relación del tipo de la identidad. Sostengo que tal explicación tiene las siguientes ventajas: (a) ofrece una caracterización dentro de cuyo marco resulta razonable usar el mismo término, i.e., "realización", para distinguir relaciones que difieren en sus relata, como sucedió cuando se usó originalmente el término "realización"; (b) ayuda a comprender hasta qué punto la realización que se invoca en algunos textos filosóficos puede desempeñar correctamente las tareas mencionadas; (c) más en general, aclara qué puede hacer la realización.
PALABRAS CLAVE: realización, tipo de la identidad, reducción, causación mental, fisicalismo
SUMMARY: So far no clear explication of the notion of realization has been offered, in spite of the frequent uses of the notion in the literature to discharge important jobs, such as that of accounting for the causal efficacy of the mental in a physical world, and that of providing a viable characterization of physicalism, and/or psychophysical reduction. I put forward an account of realization as an identity-like relation. I argue that such account has the following advantages: (a) it provides a picture under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata, as it happened in the original uses of the term 'realization'; (b) it helps to understand how well, if at all, some appeals to realization in the literature can discharge the jobs mentioned; (c) more generally, it makes clear what realization can do.
KEY WORDS: realization, identity-like, reduction, mental causation, physicalism
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The notion of realization has been around for quite a while in the philosophy of mind. Surprisingly, however, there are not many philosophers who offer a clear explication of this notion. I think that a lot could be gained by such an explication. This is because the rôles realization is made to play are crucial. Among such rôles (or jobs, hereafter referred to as 'the Jobs') features, for instance, that of accounting for the causal efficacy of the mental in a physical world; and/or that of providing a viable characterization of physicalism, and/or psychophysical reduction, h is, then, important to be given the opportunity of properly addressing the question of how well, if at all, the Jobs can be discharged, by being provided with a clear understanding of realization.
In this paper I want to put forward my own suggestion for how realization should be understood, trying to provide the best possible understanding with respect to the discharging of the Jobs. In a nutshell, my suggestion is to understand realization as, essentially, an identity-like relation in the sense to be explained. (1) The understanding of realization as an identity-like relation (henceforth 'RIL') has, in my opinion, the following advantages:
(a) It provides a picture under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata, as it happened in the original uses of the term 'realization'.
(b) It helps to understand how well, if at all, some appeals to realization in the literature can discharge the Jobs.
(c) More generally, it makes clear what realization can do.
Claim (a) is supported by section I, where I introduce RIL. Claims (b) and (c) are supported in sections II and III, where RIL is made more specific by considering the Jobs and some appeals to realization to discharge them.
I
The first uses of the notion of realization in the philosophy of mind are associated with classical papers such as Putnam (1960), Block & Fodor (1972), and Lewis (1972). Reading these papers, one is confronted with an interesting phenomenon. The ontological categories of the relata of the relation of realization are quite miscellaneous. In Putnam (1960), for example, we find, on the realized hand, conjunctions of properties by which Turing machines can be characterized, (2) and, on the realizing hand, those devices that, by possessing any of the conjunctions of properties in question, can be said to implement one of the machines. These are the relata also in Block & Fodor (1972). There, however, we find also types of states as relata on both hands. Finally, in Lewis (1972), realization is claimed to hold between, on the one hand, ways of picking out entities which go from individuals to "sets, attributes, species, states, functions, relations, magnitudes, or what have you", (3) and, on the other hand, the entities themselves.
Given this variety, one can wonder whether it is possible to provide a unifying picture under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata. We are now going to see that this is, indeed, (part of) what can be achieved by adopting the account I want to defend.
The core of my proposal is to understand realization as an identity-like relation. An identity-like relation is a relation that resembles identity in that its relata share, when considered in one world or in a set of possible worlds, all their non-modal properties, i.e. all their properties which are not to be understood by reference to worlds other than the one/s considered.
Let me explain that by offering an example. Suppose that a statue (call it 'Statue') is constituted by a portion of clay (call it 'Clay') that carne into existence at the very moment at which the statue carne into existence, and that is destroyed by destroying the statue at some point. (4) (We may suppose that both Statue and Clay carne into existence by the putting together of two smaller portions of clay, and that they go out of existence as a result of an atomic explosion.) In the world w where Statue is constituted by Clay, Statue and Clay share a good deal of their properties: shape, colour, location, etc. In fact, the only properties they don't share are properties such as that of being essentially a statue, or that of being essentially composed of a determinate number of atoms N. These are properties which are to be understood by reference to worlds other than w. For an object is essentially a statue iff it is a statue in all the possible worlds where it exists; and an object is essentially composed of a determinate number of atoms N iff it is composed of such a number of atoms in all possible worlds. So, the constitution of Statue by Clay can be taken as an example of an identity-like relation. (5)
Statue and Clay are particulars. How are we to understand the notion of identity-like relation when the relata are properties? In such a case, I suggest, the relata share one crucial property: the property P of being instantiated by the particulars [x.sub.1], [x.sub.2], ..., [x.sub.n], where [x.sub.1], [x.sub.2], ..., [x.sub.n] stand for the particulars instantiating the relata in one world, or in a world-portion, or in a set of possible worlds, (6) where the two properties are, in fact, co-extensive. (7) Arguably, the instantiation of P by two properties ensures their indiscernibility in all their properties which are non-modal in the sense above. (8) We can then understand an identity-like relation between properties as a relation where the relata share P.
That amounts to understanding an identity-like relation between properties as a relation of overlapping between the sets of the instances of the relevant properties. For, given our understanding of P, whenever two properties stand in an identity-like relation, some of their instances will coincide.
It now begins to be possible to see--I hope--how by understanding realization as an identity-like relation we can provide the kind of picture mentioned at the beginning of this section, that is a picture under which it makes sense to use the same term, i.e. 'realization', to pick out relations that differ in their relata, as it happened in the original uses of the term 'realization'. The idea is to regard the relevant relations differing in their relata as different ways of describing a single situation, i.e. the 'overlapping situation' which has just been brought out by our explication of the notion of identity-like relation between properties. This overlapping situation can be described as a case of realization between properties, taking the overlapping properties to be the realizing and the realized properties, and, also, as a case of realization between a property and some particulars, taking the realizing particulars to be the coincident instances. We can then choose to regard either of the relations, i.e. that between properties and that between a property and some particulars, as primary. We can, for example, choose to regard realization as primarily the relation that holds between properties in our overlapping scenario. The realized property can then be regarded as realized, also, derivatively, by the coincident particulars. If we do decide to look at things in this way (and, in fact, I think that it would be a good idea to do so, in the light of the uses of realization that we are going to consider in the next sections), the understanding of realization put forward is that of realization as (primarily) an identity-like relation between properties. (9)
What needs to be done now is some work to make this understanding more specific. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between different forms that the overlapping under discussion can take. Each form corresponds to a determinate scenario which can, in turn, be paired up with a specific understanding, as opposed to others, of the idea of realization as an...
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