On the very idea of a robust alternative.
| Autor | Moya, Carlos J. |
| Cargo | Texto en inglés - Ensayo |
RESUMEN: Según el Principio de Posibilidades Alternativas (PPA), un agente es moralmente responsable de una acción sólo si hubiera podido actuar de otro modo. La noción de alternativa robusta desempeña un papel prominente en ataques recientes al PPA basados en los llamados casos Frankfurt. En este artículo defiendo el PPA para la culpabilidad moral frente a casos Frankfurt propuestos recientemente por Derk Pereboom y David Widerker. Mi defensa descansa en algunos principios intuitivamente plausibles que dan lugar a una comprensión nueva dei concepto de alternativa robusta. No trataré la cuestión de la verdad dei PPA para acciones moralmente laudables.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Principio de posibilidades alternativas, casos Frankfurt, culpabilidad, Pereboom, Widerker
SUMMARY: According to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), an agent is morally responsible for an action of hers only if she could have done otherwise. The notion of a robust alternative plays a prominent role in recent attacks on PAP based on so-called Frankfurt cases. In this paper I defend the truth of PAP for blameworthy actions against Frankfurt cases recently proposed by Derk Pereboom and David Widerker. My defence rests on some intuitively plausible principles that yield a new understanding of the concept of a robust alternative. I will leave aside whether PAP also holds for praiseworthy actions.
KEY WORDS: Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Frankfurt cases, blameworthiness, Pereboom, Widerker
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Introduction: Some Background
The general view that alternative possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility (MR for short, in what follows) finds a particular expression in the so-called Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP, for short). According to PAP, an agent is morally responsible for what she has decided and done only if she could have decided and done otherwise, or at least if she could have avoided deciding and acting as she did. We shall restrict our concern mainly to decisions, with occasional reference to overt actions. In addition, we will deal with PAP in connection with moral blameworthiness only, leaving aside praiseworthiness. PAP was once taken to be almost self-evidently true, but is nowadays under strong pressure. In fact, many philosophers think it is false. Their main reasons for this position have to do with so-called Frankfurt cases. (1)
Frankfurt cases are supposed to be conceptually possible situations in which an agent, on her own and for her own reasons, makes a certain decision which, owing to circumstances of which she is fully unaware, is the only one she can actually make; now, the circumstances that make an alternative decision impossible do not cause or influence in any way her actual decision; she makes this decision spontaneously, with no hindrance or coercion and on the basis of suitable reasons; in situations with these features, it seems that the agent is morally responsible for her decision, though she could not have decided otherwise. If this is so, then PAP is false.
Part of what fuels the intuition of the agent's MR in Frankfurt cases is that, given the causal insignificance of the circumstances that rule out an alternative decision, the actual decision is the one the agent would have made anyway, even if those circumstances had been absent and she could have decided otherwise. So, these cases are supposed to show that having access to alternative decisions is irrelevant to an agent's MR for the decision she actually makes. What is important for such MR is the actual causal history of the decision and whether this causal history is of the right sort, so that it does not contain coercion or any other factors that are commonly taken to diminish or rule out MR; it does not matter whether alternative decisions were available or whether the actual decision might have had a different causal history. Against this "actual history" or "actual sequence" view of MR, PAP suggests instead the view that what an agent can do or could have done is also relevant to the MR she bears for what she does. I will try to show that the latter view is correct.
Original Frankfurt cases, designed by Frankfurt himself (cf. Frankfurt 1969), feature an agent who decides and does on her own something which, unknown to her, she would be caused to decide and do anyway by an alien factor if she were to show some sign that she was not going to decide and do it. The following is a case of this sort. Ina situation with morally significant profiles, Betty is deliberating about whether to lie or to tell the truth to a friend of hers concerning an important matter. Black, a nefarious neurosurgeon, wants Betty to lie and, unbeknownst to her, has implanted in her brain a device that allows him to follow Betty's deliberation; by means of this device, Black also has the power to cause a certain decision in Betty, but he prefers not to use this power if it is not strictly needed; so he witnesses the course of Betty's deliberation and, since it is clear to him, on the basis of how this course develops, that she is going to decide to lie, be does not intervene at all. Betty decides to lie (and lies) fully on her own. It seems that she is morally responsible for deciding to lie (and for lying), though she could not have decided (or acted) otherwise, and so PAP is false.
Some authors have tried to defend the spirit, if not the letter, of PAP by insisting that, in a case like this, Betty had alternatives of some sort. Though she could not have made an alternative decision, she could have shown a sign that she was going to make it. So, showing this sign or not showing it seem to be alternatives Betty had. Moreover, if Betty had showed that sign, Black would have intervened and, though she still would have made the decision to lie, she would not have made it spontaneously or on her own. It seems, then, that deciding to lie (and lying) on her own or not on her own were also alternatives Betty had (cf. Davidson 1973; Naylor 1984; Wyma 1997; McKenna 1997; Otsuka 1998).
John Fischer (1994) has dubbed this strategy for saving PAP against Frankfurt cases "the flicker of freedom" defence of PAP. This is the point in the dialectics about Frankfurt cases and PAP where the notion of a robust alternative appears for the first time. According to Fischer, the alternatives pointed to by flicker theorists, even if they are present in Frankfurt cases, are not robust enough to save PAP (cf. Fischer 1994, pp. 141, 142). In order to be robust, an alternative has to be relevant to explaining the agent's MR for what she has decided (or done). And for an alternative to be explanatorily relevant, it cannot be something that merely happens and is beyond the agent's control. This is the case with the alternative of Betty's deciding to lie not on her own: this is not something she chooses to do, but something that just happens to her as a consequence of Black's detection of a certain sign and his immediate intervention. Given this, it would not be right to say that Betty is morally responsible for deciding to lie because she could (it would be more correct to say "might") have decided to lie not on her own. Though it is true that she might have decided to lie not on her own, as a result of Black's intervention, this is not the reason why she is morally responsible. The reason is that she decided fully on her own and for her own motives. The alternative possibility is there, but is not in Betty's hands, and so is powerless to explain her MR for what she did. A more extreme, though not substantially different example of explanatory irrelevance would be to contend that Betty is morally responsible for deciding to lie because she might not have decided this as a consequence of her possible sudden death. This explanation of her MR is obviously wrong. A robust alternative would be her free decision to tell the truth, but, given the features of the situation she finds herself in, this decision is not available to her.
The flicker theorist may point instead to the aforementioned alternative of Betty's showing the sign that would have prompted Black's intervention. This sign might well be an inclination of hers towards telling the truth, or her paying attention to moral reasons in favour of this alternative. Tiny as these episodes may be, they are plausibly taken to be under the agent's control. Fischer's response to this move was to point out that Frankfurt cases can be designed where the sign for Black's intervention is a mere happening, beyond the agent's control, such as a blush or a certain neurological pattern in the agent's brain (cf. Fischer 1994, p. 144). Assuming that, in the preceding example, it was a sign of this sort that alerted Black of Betty's future decision to tell the truth, it would be ludicrous to claim that Betty's was morally responsible for lying because she could have blushed or shown a certain neurological pattern. These alternative possibilities would have been mere happenings, fully behind Betty's control.
At this point in the dialectic, however, some authors (Kane 1985; Ginet 1996; and especially Widerker 1995) have developed an important argument in favour of PAP, known as the "dilemma defence'. It can be formulated as follows. Think of the sign that Black uses to remain inactive, say a blush of Betty's at a certain moment, [t.sub.1], of her deliberation process, prior to her decision to lie at [t.sub.2]. Concerning this sign, the Frankfurt theorist has to confront the following dilemma: either this sign at [t.sub.1] is (or is associated with a condition that is) causally sufficient for Betty's decision to lie at [t.sub.2] or it is not. If it is, then this decision is causally determined; but incompatibilists, who hold that MR and causal determinism cannot coexist, will not accept Betty's MR. If it is not--so that it is only a reliable, but not infallible, symptom of Betty's later decision--she may be morally responsible for...
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