Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo
| Autor | Miguel Ángel Sebastián |
| Cargo | Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
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CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 47, No. 140 (agosto 2015): 31–42
BORDERLINE EXPERIENCES ONE CANNOT UNDERGO
MIGUEL ÁNGEL SEBASTIÁN
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México msebastian@gmail.com
SUMMARY: Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the relation of representation can itself be naturalized. For this purpose, representationalists with naturalistic inclinations typically appeal to teleological theories of mental content.
Not much attention has been paid, however, to the interaction between representationalism and teleological theories of content. This paper will provide reasons to think that such an interaction is not felicitous. In particular, I will argue that those who endorse the conjunction of these two theories are committed to the existence of impossible experiences.
KEY WORDS: vagueness, interindeterminacy, consciousness, representationalism, teleosemantics
RESUMEN: El representacionismo defiende que el carácter fenoménico de la experiencia queda completamente determinado por su contenido intencional. El representacionismo es una teoría muy atractiva dentro del proyecto de naturalizar la consciencia según la hipótesis de que la relación de representación puede a su vez ser naturalizada. Para este propósito, los representacionistas con inquietudes naturalistas acuden normalmente a teorías teleosemánticas del contenido mental.
No se ha prestado, sin embargo, demasiada atención a la interacción entre el representacionismo y las teorías teleosemánticas del contenido mental. Este artículo da razones para pensar que tal interacción no es venturosa. En particular, argumentaré que aquellos que abrazan la conjunción de ambas teorías están comprometidos con la existencia de experiencias imposibles.
PALABRAS CLAVE: vaguedad, interindeterminación, consciencia, representacionismo, telosemántica
1 . Teleological Representationalism (TR)
Representationalism is one of the most interesting and popular theories of consciousness. According to it, the phenomenal character of experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Conscious experiences are, therefore, representational states. Representationalism is an appealing theory for materialists, on the assumption that the relation of representation can itself be naturalized.
The virtual majority in the business of naturalizing consciousness by reducing the problem of consciousness to the problem of
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representation assumes that teleological theories of mental content can deliver the naturalistic theory their accounts require.1 Not much attention has been paid, however, to the interaction between representationalism on the one hand and teleosemanticism on the other. This paper will provide reasons to think that the interaction between these two theoretical endeavors is not felicitous.
I call “teleological theory” to any account in which the teleological notion of function plays a constitutive role in the determination of reference. For example, Dretske (1988) defends that the notion of representation is intimately connected to that of indication (carrying information). But we don’t want to maintain that a mental state M represents all the things that it indicates; M represents exclusively those entities that it indicates in normal conditions. This is a normative notion that has to be unpacked and for this purpose teleological theories appeal to the teleological function of M: a representing system is one that has the teleological function of indicating that such-and-such is the case, being such-and-such its intentional content.
Roughly, the teleological function of mental state M is what M was selected for, where selection is understood as natural selection (Wright 1973; Millikan 1984, 1989, and Neander 1991).21 Representationalism is defended, inter alia, by Carruthers (2000); Dretske (1995); Harman (1990); Kriegel (2009); Shoemaker (1994, 2000, 2003), and Tye (1997, 2002). Most representationists who are committed to naturalizing content and have taken a stance on how this is to be done, embrace teleosemantics:
[T]he way an experience represents an object is the way that object would be if the representational system were working right, the way it is supposed to work, the way it was designed to work. (Dretske 1995, p. 73)
Where there is a design, normal conditions are those in which the creature or system was designed to operate. (Tye 2002, p. 121)
A mental representation is a mental state that has been set up to be set o by something. (Prinz 2004, p. 54)
The outlines of a physicalist account of representational content have been developed most fully and convincingly, to my mind, by Fred Dretske (1981, 1986, 1988) [. . . ] When a neurophysiological event in the brain is recruited in this way, thanks to the information it carries, it is said to have the function of carrying that information. (Kriegel 2009, pp. 76–77)
For an exception see Carruthers (2000).
2 I am considering here, as teleosemanticists typically do, etiological theories of function and not discussing other appeals. Alternative theories of teleological function, according to which the teleological function of a trait does not depend on its causal history are offered, for example, by Schroeder 2004, and Mossio et al. 2009.
Crítica , vol. 47, no. 140 (agosto 2015)
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BORDERLINE EXPERIENCES ONE CANNOT UNDERGO 33 A representationalist who embraces teleological theories (hence-forth TR) will defend something along the combination of the following two principles:
Representationalism Having an experience with phenomenal character Q is being in a state that represents a certain content C.
Teleological A state M represents C because M has the teleological function of indicating C.3 M has the teleological function of indicating C, because indicating C is what M has been selected for.4 M has been selected for indicating M for example in the following case:
1. M has indicated C in a sufficient number of S’s ancestors.
2. M indicating C has contributed positively to the fitness of S.
In order to have certain content C, M has to have been selected for. It is not only the causal role of the state, but also its history what explains the content that M has.
2 . Interindeterminacy
In order to present my argument, let me introduce the notion of interindeterminacy.
Interindeterminacy Two predicates like “is A” and “is B” are interindeterminates if and only if there is an individual x such that it is indeterminate whether x is A and, at the same time, it is indeterminate whether x is B.
These theories are not targeted by this argument. It is an open question whether they can satisfactorily account for the normativity in the relation of representation.
3 I assume that states are individuated by its causal role. This, of course, does not prevent that a finer-grain individuation can be made attending to whether the state has been selected for indicating or not and therefore, according to teleosemanticists, between states that have a content and those that do not.
4 Telesemanticists are aware that not every content can be naturalized this way. The complications they introduce to solve this problem are irrelevant for my current purposes.
For the discussion of the distinction between selection for and selection of see Sober 1984.
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An example of interindeterminate predicates would be “is yellow” and “is green” for there are colors such that it is indeterminate whether they are yellow and, at the same time, indeterminate whether they are green. On the other hand, an example...
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