Analyticity and Context-Sensitivity. On Gillian Russell´s Account of Truth in Virtue of Meaning
| Autor | Alfonso Losada |
| Cargo | Universidad de Buenos Aires. CONICET |
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CRÍTICA, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía. Vol. 46, No. 137 (agosto 2014): 37–60
ANALYTICITY AND CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY. ON GILLIAN RUSSELL’S ACCOUNT OF TRUTH IN VIRTUE OF MEANING
ALFONSO LOSADA
Universidad de Buenos Aires
CONICET alfonsolosada@yahoo.com.ar
SUMMARY: An objection is made to Gillian Russell’s (2008) attempt to give an account of analyticity in its metaphysical understanding —that is, that a sentence is analytic just in case it is true in virtue of its meaning. The objection focuses on the semantic aspects of the account, arguing that the kind of context sensitivity envisaged in it ends up yielding the disastrous result that no sentence is analytic in the intended manner. Two possible replies to the objection are analyzed and rebutted.
KEY WORDS: semantics, metasemantics, meaning-assignment, character, reference
RESUMEN: Presento una objeción al intento de Gillian Russell (2008) de proporcionar una teoría de la analiticidad en su lectura metafísica —es decir, que una oración es analítica sólo en caso de que sea verdadera en virtud de su significado—. La objeción se centra en los aspectos semánticos de la teoría, y argumento que el tipo de sensibilidad al contexto que se propone en la misma termina produciendo el resultado desastroso de que ninguna oración es analítica en el modo buscado. Analizo y rechazo dos posibles respuestas a la objeción.
PALABRAS CLAVE: semántica, metasemántica, asignación de significado, carácter, referente
1 . Metaphysical and Epistemological Analyticity
A sentence is said to be analytic if it is true in virtue of its meaning. Traditional examples of analytic sentences are conceptual, mathematical and (instances of) logical truths, such as:
(i) All bachelors are men.
(ii) 2 + 2 = 4.
(iii) Either snow is white or it isn’t.
(iv) A or not A.
In saying that a sentence is true in virtue of meaning we might mean two things. Following Boghossian, we can distinguish a metaphysical understanding of the notion, from an epistemological one:
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On [one] understanding, “analyticity” is an overtly epistemological notion: a statement is “true by virtue of its meaning” provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth.
Another, far more metaphysical reading of the phrase “true by virtue of meaning” is also available, however, according to which a statement is analytic provided that, in some appropriate sense, it owes its truth value completely to its meaning, and not at all to the facts. (Boghossian 1996, p. 363)
In the early stages, it seemed that there was an intimate relation between the two readings.1 For, a sentence was thought to be analytic if its truth was dependent on its meaning alone. And, if there are sentences that fulfill this condition, one could justifiably come to believe one of these sentences (or the proposition it expresses) independently of outer experience: it would only take examination and comprehension of the meaning of the sentence to determine that it is true. Furthermore, given the latter, analyticity seemed to be very useful in order to account for the a priori knowledge of certain truths.
Quine’s attack on the notion (1935, 1951 and 1954) made a huge impact and nowadays many follow him in rejecting it. However, recently, some defenders of analyticity have emerged, though with qualified versions of it. On one side, Paul Boghossian (1996 and 2003) holds that one can sustain an epistemological conception of analyticity, along with its epistemological advantages; but he also holds that this does not commit us to the metaphysical conception. In fact, he rejects the latter for he finds it “of dubious explanatory value and possibly also of dubious coherence” (Boghossian 1996,
p. 364).
On the other side, Gillian Russell (2008) has defended the notion in its metaphysical understanding. But, unlike Boghossian, she departs from the epistemological understanding, divorcing the metaphysical feature from the epistemological properties that were once associated with the notion —although she does signal some possibly interesting consequences for justification of beliefs arising from her metaphysical notion.
In this paper, I will be concerned with Russell’s account of truth in virtue of meaning, discussing her proposal, focusing on its semantic aspects. The main focus of criticism will be the different
1 Probably the major defender of the notion in contemporary philosophy was Rudolf Carnap (1947, 1950 and 1952)
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kinds of context-sensitivity that she presents as a basis for explaining the (lack of) analyticity of the sentences of natural language. I will mostly leave aside sentences of logic and mathematical truths, but I believe an extension of the objection to those domains of discourse can be easily provided. In Section 2, I present Russell’s account of analyticity in its modal conception and the kind of meaning involved in it. In Section 3, I present the problem for Russell’s proposal, based on considerations regarding context-sensitivity. I will argue that, if certain expressions present sensitivity to a context of introduction, as Russell holds, it can only be so at the expense of a general phenomenon of sensitivity to context of use, in a sense to be explained. The latter has the consequence that no sentence will fulfill the condition of being true in virtue of meaning. In Section 4, I consider two possible replies from the supporter of Russell’s view, which will hopefully help us understand better the points from the previous section.
2 . Russell’s Account of Analyticity
According to a widespread view on semantics, advocated by Russell, a declarative sentence is used to express a proposition, which in turn encodes its truth conditions, that is, the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the sentence to be true. Different expressions contribute with different components to propositions, such as properties, particular objects and individuals. Some expressions, such as names and indexicals, are directly referential: they contribute to the propositional content expressed by the sentence in which they appear with the object referred to. A further component of the semantic profile of indexicals and demonstratives is given by a rule for picking out a referent relative to a context of use. Finally, semantic externalism has it that a competent speaker needs not possess knowledge of identifying conditions in order to refer to an object/kind/substance/property. The referential mechanism is external to him and does not depend on his knowledge. (Russell is following here the lead of philosophers such as Kaplan (1989b), Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975).)
In an attempt to deepen the conceptual progress made by the advocates of such views, Russell distinguishes four senses in which we might talk about an expression’s meaning:
Character: the thing speakers must know (perhaps tacitly) to count as understanding an expression.
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Content: what the word contributes to what a sentence containing it says (the proposition it expresses).
Reference Determiner: a condition which an object must meet in order to be the referent of, or fall in the extension of, an expression.
Referent/Extension: the (set of) object(s) to which the term applies. (Russell 2008, pp. 45–46)
In order to elucidate how a sentence can be true in virtue of meaning, we start by noticing that the semantic value of a sentence depends on two factors: what the sentence means and what the world is like. According to Russell, a sentence is true in virtue of meaning when the meaning of the sentence fully determines its truth value: no matter what state of affairs is considered as a point for evaluating what the sentence says, it will always be the case that the extension of the latter will be True.2Now, given that we have distinguished several aspects or types of meaning, we must ask what is the meaning involved in “truth in virtue of meaning”. In the past, the aspect of meaning considered as relevant was that of Content —which in turn makes the world of evaluation the relevant state of affairs for determining the sentence’s truth value. Russell notes that this assumption leads to two troublesome consequences, one for the general way of understanding how the value of an expression may be shifted according to the two-factor account advocated by her, and the other regarding the results for an account of analyticity. First, if meaning is understood as content, then the two-factor story does not work for certain expressions, namely, directly referential terms, for we couldn’t change their value unless their reference was shifted. Once we settle a content (relative to a referent assignment), there is no way of shifting the expression’s value unless we shift its referent. For example, given that proper names are directly referential, the content of “Saul Kripke” is Saul Kripke, its referent. Had “Saul Kripke” meant David Kaplan, it would contribute David Kaplan to the proposition expressed
2 This characterization of the notion avoids one of the major objections to it, namely, the one that says that the notion makes little sense, for it is a truism that for any sentence S, S is true iff for some p, S means that p, and p. So, the idea of a sentence being true in virtue of meaning alone is absurd, for it is clearly wrong to think that meaning can determine the truth value of the sentence by itself (Quine 1954, p. 113; Boghossian 1996, pp. 364–365). A response similar to Russell’s is explored in Hofmann and Horvath’s 2008.
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by every sentence containing it; but this would only be so because the referent...
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